Tuesday, June 18, 2024

Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire by Stanley Wolpert-A Review

 


Wolpert, Stanley. Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

              The Partition of India remains one of the great tragedies of the Twentieth century, with estimates of hundreds of thousands to over a million dead. The end of the British Raj witnessed the division of India with the creation of Pakistan, accompanied by communal violence and death, resulting in death and the migration of millions. The heartbreak of 1947 continues to impact the relationship between India and Pakistan. The massive slaughter of Partition still causes many historians and politicians to ponder the cause of the tragedy and whether there were other alternatives. In Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire, Stanley Wolpert explores the events that led to the tragic events of Partition. Wolpert examines Partition and the independence of India and Pakistan through a chronological survey beginning with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese and ending with the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir in 1948. Wolpert centers his study on the British and Indian leaders, whose decisions led to the tragedy of Partition. Wolpert contends that the massive death toll was avoidable if not for the "arrogance and ignorance of British and Indian leaders (2). The author places the bulk of the blame on the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, whose egotism and impatience prevented a peaceful resolution, leading to unneeded bloodshed.

            The book’s title, Shameful Flight, stems from the remarks made by Winston Churchill during the first debate over the Indian Independence Bill, when Churchill condemned the shameful flight of Britain from South Asia (9). The Labor Party's determination to leave India, combined with Mountbatten's insistence on accelerating the withdrawal, left the Indian subcontinent susceptible to terror and violence. Wolpert lays some blame on the shoulders of Indian leaders in addition to the British. Congress leaders failed to recognize the attempts by Sir Stafford Cripps to bring about Indian independence after World War II. Churchill undercut the Cripps mission even as the premier used Cripps to demonstrate to Roosevelt of British fairness to India (9). The Congress campaign, Quit India, gave Viceroy Linlithgow the excuse to imprison the leaders of Congress, including Nehru and Gandhi. The absence of Congress Party leaders allowed the leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah, the opportunity to demonstrate the loyalty of Muslim India to Britain while promoting Pakistan as a reward for the faithful service of Muslim troops.

            World War II significantly changed the British economy, as wartime dependence on Indian foodstuffs and iron made Britain a prime debtor to India. Labor victory in the 1945 general elections made economic and reform goals the priorities on Prime Minister Atlee’s agenda, placing the needs of India as an irritant that needed a quick resolution. Atlee hoped that the charisma of Mountbatten might charm Indian leaders and allow Britain to extract their troops and citizens while still maintaining their respectability. However, Wolpert contends that Mountbatten lacked the experience or sense to listen to India's most experienced leaders, Gandhi and Jinnah, who warned Mountbatten of the perils of a rushed partition (10). Further Mountbatten’s friendship with Nehru impacted his relationship with Jinnah. Nehru’s negative judgment of Jinnah colored the Viceroy’s interactions with Jinnah and led Mountbatten away from an even-handed approach (135). Mountbatten's negative assessment of Jinnah possibly influenced the drawing of the boundary favoring India. The Punjabi sub-districts of Firozpur and ZIra went to India despite being majority Muslim but allowed India a direct route to Kashmir.

            Mountbatten also ignored any advice or proposals from Gandhi, who continually warned the Viceroy of the perils awaiting India when Partition became a reality. Gandhi proposed to Mountbatten that Jinnah form a new central government with Muslim League members instead of a Congress-led government. Mountbatten never mentioned Gandhi's plan with Jinnah and instead discussed the plan with Nehru, who rejected the idea immediately.

But Mountbatten was so profoundly ignorant of the complexities he rushed into, and Nehru was so outraged by Gandhi’s “treacherous” idea that neither was willing to give it the chance of still saving India by proposing it to Jinnah (139).

 

Mountbatten dismissed Gandhi just as he dismissed Jinnah. The Viceroy determined to “cut and run, full speed ahead (141).

            Wolpert’s primary sources for his account are the twelve volumes on the end of the British Raj, entitled The Transfer of Power, 1942-7. The chronological treatment the author engages concentrates mainly on the prominent British and Indian leaders making the decisions. While Wolpert discusses the communal violence between Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, the actions and the suffering of ordinary people remain secondary to the thesis of the book. There is little doubt that decisions by the Congress Party and the Muslim League, in addition to British political leadership, led to the tragedy of Partition. Still, Wolpert claims that the results were not inevitable. Wolpert argues that Jinnah and Gandhi, "had either of British India's two greatest leaders been willing to subordinate his own ambitions to the leadership of the other, India might well have won its freedom much earlier and without Partition (3-4)."  However, one also needs to wonder if either Jinnah or Gandhi ever had complete command over their followers. As time passed, the ability of the leadership to control their constituencies entirely became almost impossible.

            After Indian independence, Mountbatten returned to Britain as a hero, but he left India and Pakistan with scars and hostility that remain today. As Viceroy, Mountbatten's primary concern was to absolve the British of the disaster on the horizon (167). Keeping the boundary lines secret until the last moment added to the confusion, leading to conflict. Wolpert’s examination of The Transfer of Power convinced him that Mountbatten’s incompetence and his negative attitude toward Jinnah contributed to the massive death toll of Partition (11). Nehru also looked back at Partition with regrets, seeing lost opportunities in his refusal of Cripp’s 1942 plan or later cabinet plans. Nehru held out hope for a federal link between India and Pakistan but feared that the other option was war (192).

            Partition remains one of the bloodiest tragedies of the twentieth century, and Wolpert performs an admirable job in demonstrating that the leadership mistakes led to the deaths of thousands, if not millions. But the outcome was avoidable. While South Asian leaders shared the blame, Wolpert makes a strong claim for British responsibility in a tragedy that lives on today as nuclear-powered India and Pakistan continue their dispute. 


Friday, May 17, 2024

Unit 371 and the American Cover-up

   

Unit 731 complex-By Unknown author
Wikipedia

    

         Unit 371 and the American Cover-up

Atrocities are no stranger to warfare, and no nation, even the United States, is not exempt from the stain of war crimes. World War II witnessed carnage rarely seen before as new technology contributed to the cruelty and the multitude of victims. Most are familiar with the millions of victims perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jewish population of Europe. Still, fewer are familiar with the many victims inflicted by the Japanese within their conquered territory. Unlike the Holocaust, few are familiar with the cruelty imposed upon the many victims of Japanese atrocities. During their occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese maintained a secret biological warfare unit called Unit 731 that experimented on humans to develop chemical and biological weapons. Prisoners of the Japanese found themselves the victims within something akin to a death camp where they were treated as human lab rats and subjected to experiments with no thought to their humanity. Besides experiments using germ warfare, many were subjected to experiments involving human dehydration, starvation, frostbite, air pressure, animal-to-human blood transfusions, and a host of terrors that treated humans as guinea pigs.[1] Looking at the thousands of deaths and the immense cruelty foisted upon the victim, one would assume that the perpetrators behind Unit 731 faced similar judgment from the Allied powers that Nazi leaders behind the Holocaust faced. However, that assumption is mistaken. The United States not only never prosecuted those responsible for the atrocities but provided the guilty Japanese medical and military authorities pardon and protection in exchange for the exclusive use of the scientific findings developed within Unit 731. To prevent Japanese research on biological warfare from falling into Soviet hands, American authorities protected those responsible for some of the war’s worst atrocities in exchange for their knowledge. The goal of this paper is to present an outline of the atrocities of Unit 731 and examine the response of American officials in shielding Japanese war criminals.

Shirō Ishii, commander of Unit 731
taken from Wikipedia

The leader of Unit 731 was Ishii Shiro, the organizer and primary mover behind the planning and development of biological research and experiments in Manchuria. Unit 731 was the first of several units created as an extension of the research lab, the Epidemic Prevention Research Laboratory, and under the authority of the Japanese Army Military Medical School in Tokyo. Unit 731 was the most notorious of several units within Japanese conquered territory that served as field laboratories for developing biological weaponry.[2] Dr. Ishii studied medicine at Kyoto Imperial University and received training as a microbiologist. He spent his career as a medical officer in the Japanese Army and began researching the impact of biological and chemical warfare used during World War I.[3] Japan was one of the signatories of the Geneva Convention of 1925, prohibiting the use of biological and chemical warfare. As a microbiologist, Ishii reasoned that the prohibition of biological weapons meant that if these weapons were so destructive to require constraints, then these weapons must be effective and worthy of investigation.[4] He further reasoned that if these weapons were outlawed, then research into biological warfare could greatly benefit Japan if these weapons became part of the Japanese arsenal and that biological weapons required no natural resources that, at the time, were difficult for Japan to acquire.[5] Ishii paid close attention to the reports of the Geneva Convention and, after careful reading, became convinced of the possibilities of biological weapons for the Japanese military.[6]  

Ishii climbed quickly to become Japan’s chief champion for biological research and development. In 1930, Ishii received an appointment as professor of immunology at the Tokyo Army Medical School and began lobbying for research on biological warfare. The 1931 Mukden Incident, after the Japanese army swept into Manchuria from their bases in Korea, allowed Ishii to expand biological experiments. By 1932, the Japanese conquered all of Manchuria, and the region became the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. Manchukuo opened up an entirely new dimension of germ warfare for Ishii as he expanded his research facilities into Manchuria to develop new weapons.[7] The remoteness of Manchuria allowed the researchers to carry out experiments without interference. Ishii planned experiments using humans very early in the planning, but the use of live human subjects became too difficult in Japan. The use of human beings began as early as 1932.[8]

Puppet state of Manchuko & Korea as a Japanese colony
Notice te proximity to the Soviet Union
Map from Wikipedia

The proximity of Manchuria to the USSR was a possible motive for the placement of Unit 731 within Manchuria. If war broke out between Japan and the Soviets, then the use of bacteriological weapons would be instrumental in a possible invasion of the Russian Far East. Japan’s Kantokuen plan, created by the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese Army, called for an invasion of the eastern region of the Soviet Union, taking advantage of Germany’s invasion of the USSR in June 1941. The Kantokuen plan included heavy use of chemical and biological weapons with spraying from aircraft, biological bombs, and importation of biological weapons using saboteurs. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, all biological and chemical units received orders to increase production, indicating a need for readiness in the advent of war with the Soviets. [9]

Ishii received enthusiastic support from all levels of the Japanese army in Manchuria as the military commanders remained convinced that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable and that the Russians were actively engaged in biological weapon research. The assumption of Soviet research into germ warfare convinced the Japanese of the need for self-protection.[10] General Umezu Yoshijiro summarized the Japanese viewpoint during an interrogation in 1945,

Under the supposition that BW could be employed in modern warfare, the Japanese military made a considerable study and research in BW in order that it might be able to cope with it in the event that it were used. I may say that in this connection, I have received no report on the use of BW by the U.S., Britain, or China. But neither did I receive reports that this weapon would not be used. Therefore the Japanese Army had to extend itself to study BW and to obtain knowledge in this field. As to the Soviet Union… reports were received concerning their intentions to use BW in the eventuality of war… This was considered one of the principal motives of the Japanese study in BW.[11]

The belief in an impending conflict with the Soviets led the military hierarchy to believe in the necessity of biological research, providing Ishii full authority to begin experimentation.

            Ishii began his work at the Zhong Mafortress in Beiyinhe, just outside Harbin, and then at Pingfan, thirty-five miles south of Harbin, where a sizeable biological warfare research and development facility was constructed. Human experiments began in as soon as construction at the unit in Beiyinhe finished. In 1936, Pingfan became the headquarters of the Ishii network as Pingfan villagers were forced from their homes and farms. The Japanese forced all the surrounding villages to evacuate and left at six hundred Chinese villagers homeless.  A large complex with at least seventy-six structures with administrative buildings, laboratories, civilian dormitories, military quarters, barns, stables, an autopsy and dissection building, a laboratory for frostbite experiments, a farm and greenhouses, a prison to house human test subjects, a power plant, three furnaces to burn bodies, and a recreational center. Attached to the recreation center was a brothel populated with “comfort women,” better classified as sex slaves. Also, part of the complex was an airfield and a special railroad spur. The whole complex totaled six square kilometers.[12] In 1936, Ishii’s unit was designated the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kuantung Army, and Ishii received the title of chief of water purification. Ishii previously invented a water filter, and he used his influence to lobby the military to support his research into biological experimentation. The research base in Pingfan changed to Unit 731 in 1941.[13]

            The unit in Pingfan became the manufacturing center for bacteriological weaponry, breeding vectors, and bombs to spread various diseases. The prison kept a number of captives, Chinese, Manchurians, Koreans, and Russians, for use as experimental subjects. The Japanese infected, treated and reinjected the prisoners until they died. The conditions experienced by the victims were comparable to the worst experiences of those within Nazi concentration camps. [14] Unit 731 eventually encompassed 3000 personnel, 150 buildings, and the ability to imprison 600 detainees at a time for experiments. Thousands of human beings were experimented on and killed at Unit 731 alone. However, Unit 731 became the center of other units throughout Japanese-occupied territories that conducted biological experiments on human beings. Units affiliated with Unit 731 became established within major Chinese cities. With Unit 731 in Pingfan serving as the hub, other affiliated stations such as Unit 1644 in Nanking, Unit 1855 in Beijing, and Unit 100 in Changchun spread deadly epidemics within China and other Asian nations.[15] With Unit 731, the network of units was often known as the Ishii Network, indicating the importance of General Ishii as the founder.[16] Eventually, thousands died from experiments that tortured and treated the victims as less than human. It is doubtful that the complete number of victims will ever become known.[17] However, the totals of the dead exclude those who passed from the epidemics experienced by the communities around Ping Fam. Plagues regularly broke out each autumn from 1946-1948 and spread throughout the Harbin region. In 1947, a plague epidemic broke out and impacted much of northeast China, eventually killing more than 30,000 people. With no historical memory of an epidemic of such magnitude before 1945, many Chinese physicians became convinced that the plague resulted from thousands of infected animals released by the Japanese.[18]

            Large numbers of Chinese people became victims of experiments conducted at Unit 731. Any Chinese who revolted against Japanese rule came to be regarded as criminals and arrested and shipped to Ping fan. The Japanese called the prisoners maruta or logs of wood. Each year, the Japanese military and Manchurian captured at least six hundred maruta and sent them to Unit 731 as experimental subjects. Once the maruta entered the unit prison, they faced untold horror and terror.[19] The designation as maruta or logs of wood reflected the racist attitude of the Japanese, who regarded the Chinese as an inferior race. Tamura Yoshio served as a junior researcher at Unit 731 and arrived at the facility in 1939. Yoshio arrived at the facility confident in the superiority of the Japanese people and his superiors emphasized that the prisoners were communists and criminals deserving no pity. Asked how he viewed the prisoners and if he had any feelings of pity, Yoshio said,

Well. None at all. We were like that already. I had gotten to where I lacked pity. After all we were already implanted with a narrow racism, in the form of a belief in the superiority of the so-called “Yamato Race.” We disparaged all other races. That kind of racism. If we didn’t have a feeling of racial superiority, we couldn’t have done it. People with today’s sensibilities don’t grasp this. That’s why I’m afraid of the of education. We, ourselves, had to struggle with our humanity afterwards. It was an agonizing process. There were some who killed themselves, unable to endure. After the defeat.[20]

 

Designating the imprisoned Chinese as criminals also justified the inhumane treatment the prisoners experienced. During interrogation, Japanese researchers claimed that since the prisoners faced execution, human experimentation was permissible. During an interrogation of General Ishii, the interrogator quotes Japanese General Kawashima, who used this reasoning during his interrogation,

From 150 to 200 criminals were confined in two guard houses, and the number of criminals which was delivered annually to the unit amounted to 500 to 600, and therefore, while I was with the unit, approximately 1,000 to 1,200 criminals were received by the unit. The experiments on them were performed before they were executed. Should an experimental subject survive, then he was used for some other experiment. The virulence of cholera, typhoid, typhus, plague was experimented on these criminals. I, personally, have seen the guardhouses and the condition within, and I have personally witnessed some of the human experiments which were conducted at the ANDA Experimental Field. Since I have seen these facts, I testify as these being the truth.[21]

 

Estimates demonstrate that more than three thousand people died from experimentation using biological and chemical weapons at Unit 731 during the Asia-Pacific War.[22] However, human experimentation also occurred, beginning in 1932 at the facility in Beiyinhe, making the estimates of fatalities challenging to determine.

            Unit 731 received backing from the Japanese military hierarchy and continued support from Japanese universities and medicals, which regularly provided the unit with research personnel and doctors. Doctors and researchers conducted numerous experiments on human subjects using various methods for multiple goals. Areas of experimentation included exposure to cholera, epidemic hemorrhagic fever, plague, and frostbite. A primary motivation for Unit 731's actions was to discover methods to protect Japanese troops from illness and disease. Researchers desired to observe the stages of diseases in humans. Therefore, Japanese researchers infected their victims with numerous diseases to witness each disease stage. Some doctors experimented with chloroform and potassium cyanide. In 1946, Shiro Kasahara confessed to performing experiments with humans with epidemic hemorrhagic fever and admitted “he put them to sleep with chloroform.”[23]

Human Dissection Experiment Room at Harbin's 731 Museum
taken from Wikipedia

 Human vivisection on infected persons to see the effects on organs was often performed on victims without the use of anesthesia.[24] The deliberate infection of a human with a deadly pathogen paints a cruel picture, but live dissection goes beyond cruelty, yet the practice became common at the facility in Pingfan. In an interview Tamura Yoshio describes the process of extracting bacteria from the organs of a living person,

Did you let the person live to the very last moment and try to extract plague bacteria?

 

Yes, that was the objective. Unless you dissected them quickly, extraneous bacteria would intrude.

 

Did you do it while they were alive?

 

[He pauses for a very long time] Yeah. Yes, at the moment when he may or may not still have a breath of life remaining. If time passed, the effect of the experiment would be reduced.[25]

 

Japan at War: An Oral History

During interrogation and trial by the Soviets Kawashima Kiyoshi, testified to some of the methods used to investigate diseases,

If a prisoner survived the inoculation of lethal bacteria, this did not save him from a repetition of the experiments, which were continued until death from infection supervened. The infected people were given medical treatment to test various methods of cure; they were fed normally, and after they had fully recovered, they were used for the next experiment but infected with another kind of germ. At any rate, no one ever left this death factory alive.[26]

 

Possible warfare with the Soviet Union entailed the requirement that Japanese soldiers experience combat in freezing weather, and doctors anticipated the need to treat large numbers of soldiers for frostbite. In an attempt to learn more about the prevention and treatment of frostbite, the researchers at Unit 731 exposed their prisoners to subzero weather conditions. During the winter months, prisoners stood outside barefooted, or their limbs were placed into freezing water until they became frostbitten. Often, their legs or arms were stricken by a club to assess if they were frozen. Once frostbitten, the captives' limbs were dipped in water to determine the best temperature for recovery.[27] Outside of the winter months, frostbite experiments took place within a special freezer unit that allowed researchers to observe their subjects through transparent windows. Men and, on occasion, women faced subzero temperatures over extended periods of time while under observation. Those that remained alive were defrosted using a variety of methods with the goal of understanding the most effective method to treat frostbite Japanese troops.[28]

Many experiments centered upon curiosity. Prisoners hung upside down for long periods to determine the amount of time it took to choke to death. Deadly radiation tested on inmates measured lethal exposure. Animal urine was inserted into human kidneys, and horse blood was injected into humans to examine if animal blood might substitute for human blood and to see if horse blood was an incubator for microbes. To study blood loss, some inmates’ limbs were removed. Other prisoners were boiled alive.[29] Parts of the liver were removed to examine how much was required to remain alive. Prisoners were shot in the stomach so surgeons might practice removing bullets. Other subjects faced the torture of the high-pressure chamber, while others placed in a centrifuge were spun to death.[30] The inhumanity of the researchers knew no bounds as they regarded the prisoners as disposable and inferior.

Ishii also directed Unit 731 to work on effective methods of disseminating pathogens to measure the result and determine the impact of an epidemic. Contaminated tools, clothing, utensils were regularly handed to prisoners to gauge the effectiveness of using ordinary items in spreading dangerous germs. Prisoners were sometimes given water, milk, coffee, beer, or sake poisoned with an organism to test its effectiveness at spreading a disease. Food also became a method for dissemination as inmates ingested food and fruit infected with pathogens such as typhoid or bubonic plague. Sweets laced with anthrax were circulated among the general population outside Pingfan, and in one incident, poisoned candy was distributed to Chinese children.[31] Japanese researchers at 731 looked to develop bombs designed to spread deadly bacterium with investigators using metal and ceramic cylinders, and while the experiments were mostly unsuccessful, the detonations were used against local populations. Aerosol dispersion using planes equipped with spray nozzles and canisters filled with bacteria were scattered over local Chinese in the countryside and villages.[32]  Dr. Qui Mingxuan was nine years old when his hometown of Quzhou faced an attack by a Japanese airplane in 1940. In 2001, Dr. Qui recalled the airplane dropping rags, soybeans, and wheat that possibly carried cholera, typhoid, and anthrax. He remembers an eruption of the plague breaking out in his community. “My relatives, friends, and classmates have died. Even the families of the dead were not allowed to see their faces one last time at their funeral because they died at the isolation hospital.” In a community where the plague was previously unknown, Japanese bacteriological weapons killed as many as 50,000 died over a six-year period.[33] Other deaths resulted from spreading plague-infected fleas and cholera bacilli. While no completely dependable and well-controlled method for using bombs to disperse biological weapons was discovered, it’s apparent that continuous Japanese experiments caused great damage and misery.[34]

One problem the Japanese faced was the ability to produce enough bacteria and viruses to conduct effective experiments and have enough storage to conduct an effective biological campaign if needed. Large areas of Unit 731 were set aside for the large ovens required to incubate and create enough bacteria. Aerobic bacteria, anthrax, cholera, plague, typhoid, and other infectious organisms emerged from the ovens every twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Chief of Division 4 at Unit 731, Kiyoshi Kawashima, assessed that at peak production, his division produced one ton of cholera bacteria, 500 to 700 kilograms of anthrax bacteria, 300 kilograms of bubonic plague bacteria, 700 to 800 kilograms of typhoid bacteria. The organisms were then collected for storage for future experimentation or deployment in biological warfare. The need for germs was so great that the ovens operated around the clock.[35]

Ruins of a boiler building at the Unit 731 bioweapons facility
                         photo from Wikipedia

The news of the Japanese surrender left General Ishii in shock, but he quickly moved to cover the evidence of war crimes. Ishii returned quickly to Pingfan and ordered the destruction of the facility, any proof of the advancing Soviets, and the deaths of the remaining maruta. Foremost in Ishii’s mind was the protection of the Emperor. The elimination of 404 prisoners took three days to complete as the bodies were burned. After the destruction of the complex, the most important scientists of Unit 731 fled to Japan.[36]

American and British governments became aware of the Japanese use of chemical and biological weaponry years before both countries entered into war with Japan. At the outbreak of the Wusung-Shanghai campaign on August 13, 1937, the American and British navies witnessed the use of poison gas against the Chinese military.[37] Chinese reports also began to filter out of the Japanese using biological weapons against Chinese civilians. In 1940, the Chinese ambassador to London reported,

On at least five occasions during the first two years the Japanese armed forces have tried to employ bacteriological warfare in China. They have tried to produce epidemics of plague in Free China by scattering plague-infected materials with aeroplanes.[38]

 

In 1943, President Roosevelt issued a statement condemning Japan’s use of biological and chemical weapons,

Authoritative reports are reaching this government of the use by Japanese armed forces in various localities of China of poisonous or noxious gases. I desire to make it unmistakably clear that if Japan persists in this inhuman form of warfare against China or against any other of the United Nations such action will be regarded by this government as though taken against the United States and retaliation in kind and in full measure will be meted out.[39]

 

After the surrender of Japan, efforts began to investigate the degree and scope of Japan’s biological weapon program. The investigation began soon after General Douglas MacArthur arrived in Tokyo in September 1945 and continued for three years until the conclusion of the War Crimes Trial in Tokyo in June 1948. 

General Douglas MacArthur in 1945
taken from Wikipedia

Arriving with MacArthur during his triumphal landing in Tokyo was Lieutenant Colonel Murray Sanders, a specialist in bacteriology from the USArmy’s Chemical Warfare Service, who was the first investigator from the U.S. biological warfare unit at Camp Detrick in Maryland to visit Japan. In 1944, as the Allies began to advance westward, intelligence reports began to receive reports of Japanese biological weaponry. In May 1944, further intelligence exposed the possibility of more advanced Japanese biological weapons, describing a diagram of a Japanese Mark 7 experimental bacillus bomb. The possibility of the Japanese using biological weapons became a real threat as the war neared its end.[40]  

Lieutenant Colonel Murray Sanders in 1945
taken from Wikipedia

            Sanders led the investigation into biological weapons soon after his arrival in Japan, but Japanese officials claimed ignorance, with key officials appearing to know nothing about biological weapon research. Beginning his investigation, Sanders contacted Dr. Naito Ryoichi, a surgeon fluent in English with a private practice outside Osaka. Unbeknownst to Sanders, Naito was a former lieutenant colonel in the medical corps with a direct connection with the Ishii Network, having served as the director of the germs weapon program in Singapore. Naito insisted that Japan’s biological weapons program only shielded troops against infectious diseases and unsanitary conditions within occupied territories. As Sanders continued to interview doctors and scientists, he was assured by the interviewees that Japanese research and experimentation were for defensive purposes. Even when confronted with biological bomb prototypes, Japanese scientists continued to stick with their stories.[41] Sanders spent ten weeks in Japan, and after returning to the United States, he spent two years recovering from tuberculosis. Years later, Sanders after the arrangement between the Japanese behind biological experimentation and U.S. officials was completed, he admitted that Naito deceived him,

I pondered about the issue so often while I lay in bed month after month. In retrospect, the deal was a mistake. But I didn’t know that human guinea pigs had been used when I suggested the arrangement and when we learned about the bacillus anthrax bombs there had still been time to prosecute the Japs at the Tokyo trials.[42]

 

Japanese scientists became very adroit in their dealing with American interrogators. They held their cards close to their chest and realized that their biological research knowledge provided the Japanese interrogees with potent leverage when bargaining for their freedom.[43]

            Sanders’ replacement was Lt. ColArvo T. Thompson, who also faced frustration in mining relevant information about biological research from Japanese scientists. Thompson located Ishii and met with the head of Unit 371 on several occasions, often over a meal. According to Ishii's daughter Harumi, Thompson pleaded with Ishii to reveal top-secret data on germ warfare, emphasizing that the "data must not fall into the hands of the Russians." While presenting Thompson with a demonstration of water purification and the designs for the mass production of bacteria, Ishii continued to insist that the cultures existed for the purpose of vaccinations.[44] Ishii insisted to Thompson that biological weapons were “inhumane” and that such warfare would “defile the virtue and benevolence of the Emperor.”[45]

            The third American investigator to examine Japanese biological research was Dr. Norman H. Fell. Fell was a civilian employee of Camp Detrick and, after reviewing the reports of Sanders and Thompson, remained guarded to look out for dishonesty. Fell met with Dr. Kan’ichiro Kamai, who had earlier assisted Murray Sanders. When pressed about withholding information about offensive biological warfare, Kamai admitted, “Interrogations were carried out too soon after the surrender.” According to Kamai, the uneasiness of the Japanese kept them from speaking freely. If the Japanese disclosed data about their experiments and were assured that none of it was used for war crime prosecution, then the scientists would divulge their secrets.[46] With the assurance of no war crimes prosecution, Japanese scientists admitted to human experimentation. As the Japanese observed that the Americans prioritized keeping biological warfare information away from the Soviets and that immunity from prosecution was a possibility, the Japanese shared the results from their human experiments. When Fell met with Ishii, Ishii refused to discuss biological weapons or human experiments until he received a written guarantee of immunity.[47]

            American fear of biological secrets falling into the hands of the Soviets was one motive for granting immunity to the scientists of the Ishii Network. American officials also believed that the combined data collected by the Japanese scientist contained a scientific and military value that outweighed the moral and ethical issues. The final report by U.S. scientists led by Dr. Edwin V. Hill and staff pathologist Dr. Joseph Victor provided the government with detailed reports on the Japanese findings, including 8000 pathological slides and hundreds of color drawings. The Hill-Victor Report summarized the value in the Japanese data,

Such information could not be obtained in our own laboratories because of scruples attached to human experimentation…It is hoped that the individuals who voluntarily contributed this information will be spared embarrassment because of it and that every effort will be taken to prevent this information from falling into other hands.[48]

 

After viewing the data, scientists of the American biological warfare program encouraged General Macarthur to grant Ishii and his associates immunity. Immunity became controversial within Truman’s cabinet, with the State Department reluctant to approve the deal. The debate caused a delay, with the Tokyo trials ending before the collection of all the evidence. This allowed the United States access to the data accumulated by the Ishii Network scientists while denying it to the Soviets.[49]

Early in January 1947, the Soviet Union demanded the extradition of Ishii and a number of his fellow researchers for investigation of their experiments, which the Soviets had learned about from captured officers and soldiers of Ishii's network after their invasion of Manchuria. The Soviets also wanted information regarding biological warfare. They warned that if the United States kept the data, the USSR would expose Japanese medical atrocities at the Tokyo Tribunal, which conducted the war crimes trial of Japanese leaders in 1946-1948. The Soviet Union did bring 12 captured officers and soldiers to trial at an open military tribunal at Khabarovsk near the China border in December 1949, often called the Khabarovsk Trial. The conclusion to the military indictment read:

The preliminary investigation in the present case has established that, in planning and preparing aggressive war against the U.S.S.R. and other states, the Japanese imperialists intended to employ on a wide scale for the accomplishments of their aims, and in part did employ, a criminal means of mass extermination of human beings—the weapon of bacteriological warfare… It has likewise been established that, to accomplish their criminal plans, the Japanese militarists did not stop at any atrocity, even performing inhuman experiments on living people and exterminating several thousand prisoners by forcibly infecting them with lethal bacteria.[50]

 

JosephKeenan, the chief prosecutor for the International Military Tribunal for theFar East, labeled the Khabarovsk tribunal a “show trial.” Because the Soviets used the trial for anti-American propaganda, the results lacked impact.[51] All twelve of the accused were pronounced guilty and sentenced to different terms of two to twenty-five years in labor camps. None were sentenced to death, and eleven were repatriated back to Japan in 1956, while the one remaining committed suicide,[52]

            The silence on Unit 731 left questions unanswered, among them the accusation that Allied prisoners of war became subjected to human experimentation. The proximity of the POW camp at Mukden to Pingfan suggests that the use of allied prisoners was a possibility. The desire of American officials to keep the data surrounding Japanese biological research hidden, the failure to provide freed Allied prisoners a complete physical exam, and the lack of records make a definitive answer very difficult to ascertain.[53] However, testimonies from prisoners of frequent examinations by Japanese medical authorities lend serious evidence that numerous prisoners were abused in biological experiments.[54] The other important question to examine is what the United States did with the data received from the Ishii Network. During the Korean War, both North Korean and Chinese authorities claimed that the American military used germ warfare through a variety of methods. The use of biological weapons during the Korean War remains a debated and little-known accusation. American military historians continue to deny the use of biological weapons by the U.S., while scientists from Russia, China, and North Korea continue to insist that the accusations are accurate.[55]

After receiving immunity, the scientists associated with the Ishii Network left the war behind and assumed prominent roles within Japanese society. Many have acquired prestigious medical, academia, and private industry positions. Unlike Germans found guilty of war crimes, the Japanese of Unit 731 worked publicly with no fear of public backlash. Some worked with their new American allies, who possibly helped the pardoned Japanese obtain employment.[56] Shiro Ishii retired to his home in Shiba Prefecture, where he lived until his death from throat cancer in 1959. During the 1980s and 1990s, the secrets of Unit 731 began to appear. Newspapers, magazines, and books revealed the long-hidden facts about the Ishii Unit. Most of the participants of Unit 731 kept quiet and refused interviews. Staying silent because of shame or loyalty, most resisted attempts to share their experiences. As one attempt reveals,

When contacted by telephone, the wife of a major, also convicted as a war criminal, said, “My husband is really ill. We’ve suffered enough. We don’t have much time left. Don’t torture us anymore. If he talks, memories come back and it’s really painful. Other people, more responsible, escaped.” She cried and sobbed over the phone. She refused to convey a request for an interview. Independent reports confirm that he was still an active jogger two years after that call.[57]

 

Many insist today that the failure to hold those involved in the atrocities at Unit 731 continues to allow the Japanese to downplay the severity of their atrocities. Hideo Shimizu was a minor when he worked at Camp 731 and still recalls seeing containers securing human bodies preserved in formalin in a specimen room and the body of a pregnant woman cut open to display the fetus. Shimizu continues to struggle to spread the truth about Unit 731 and the atrocities performed there. While the Tokyo District Court has substantiated the facts behind Unit 731 in a lawsuit brought by Chinese family members, Shimizu still hears accusations of being a liar. Exhibits featuring the atrocities of the Ishii Network are often met with complaints and protests.[58]  However, even to this day, many in Japan claim that the atrocities of Unit 731 have been exaggerated or even never happened despite the overwhelming documentary evidence. The United States, consumed with the rivalry of the coming Cold War, aided in Japan’s historical amnesia. Cold War exigency placed national security over human rights and ethical concerns. History demands that the atrocities of the Ishii Network receive the spotlight so that the victims become not merely logs or maruta but individuals undeserving of the suffering and death they endured.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] Daniel Barenblatt, A Plague upon Humanity: The Hidden History of Japan's Biological Warfare Program. (NewYork: Harper Collins Publishers, 2004), xix.

[2] Tsuneshi Keiichi, "Unit 731 and the Japanese Imperial Army's Biological Warfare Program." The Asia-Pacific Journal, Translated by John Junkerman, November 24, 2005. https://apjjf.org/tsuneishi-keiichi/2194/article.

[3] Pure Evil: Wartime Japanese Doctor Had No Regard for Human Suffering," Medical Bag, May 28, 2014. https://www.medicalbag.com/home/features/despicable-doctors/pure-evil-wartime-japanese-doctor-had-no-regard-for-human-suffering/.

[4] Hal Gold, Japan's Infamous Unit 731: Firsthand Accounts of Japan's Wartime Human Experimentation Program, (North Clarendon, VT: Tuttle Publishing, 2019), 32.

[5] Miles Pomper and Richard Pilch, "Asia-Pacific Perspective on Biological Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence in the Pandemic Era," Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4, no. 51 (2021): 343. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1880787.

[6] Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45 and the American Cover-Up, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 19.

[7] Barenblatt, 19-20.

[8] Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes In World War II, 2nd ed, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 150.

[9] Haddie Beckham and Merja Pyykkonen, Unit 731 Cover-up : The Operation Paperclip of the East. (San Francisco: Pacific Atrocities Education, 2020), 13-14.

[10] Harris, 28.

[11] Harris,28.

[12] Harris, 42-43.

[13] Doug Hickey, Scarlett Sijia Li, Celia Morrison, Richard Schulz, Michelle Thiry, and Kelly Sorenson, "Unit 731 and Moral Repair," Journal of Moral Ethics 43, no. 4 (April 2017): 270. https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/44606274.

[14] Mary Ellen Condon-Rall and Albert E. Coudrey, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan, (Washington: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), 432.

[15] Barenblatt, xx.

[16] General Ishii was the head of the entire network of units spread throughout the territories occupied by Japan. Unit 731 was the first and most important unit of the Ishii Network.

[17] Howard Brody, Sarah E. Leonard, Jing-Bao Nie, and Paul Weindling, "U.S. Responses to Japanese Wartime Inhuman Experimentation after World War II," Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics: CQ : The International Journal of Healthcare Ethics Committees 23, no. 2 (February 12, 2014): 220. https://doi.org/https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4487829/

[18] Harris, 87.

[19] Tanaka, 152.

[20] Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History, (New York: The New Press, 1992),164.

[21] Shiro Ishii, “Affidavit of Interrogation of Ishii, Shiro on 16 June 1947,” Box 5, Folder 2, The Personal Papers of Frank S. Tavenner, Jr. and Official Records from the IMTFE, 1945-1948, The International Military Tribunal for The Far East Digital Collection, 15. https://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/collections/tavenner/5/2/affidavit-interrogation-ishii-shiro-16-june-1947#

[22] Tanaka, 153.

[23] Kei-ichi Tsuneishi, “Unit 731 and the Human Skulls Discovered in 1989: Physicians Carrying Out Organized Crimes,” in Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research, ed. William R. LaFleur, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007),75.

[24] Gerhard Baader, Susan E. Lederer, Morris Low, Florian Schmaltz, and Alexander V. Schwerin, "Pathways to Human Experimentation, 1933-1945: Germany, Japan, and the United States," Osiris 20 (2005): 221. https://doi.org/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3655257

[25] Cook and Cook, 165.

[26] Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), 12. https://elearning.trree.org/file.php/1/MaterialsTrial-JapaneseArmy-1950.pdf.

[27] Gerhard Baader et al., 222,

[28] Harris, 90.

[29] Barenblatt, 78-79.

[30] "Pure Evil: Wartime Japanese Doctor Had No Regard for Human Suffering," Medical Bag, https://www.medicalbag.com/home/features/despicable-doctors/pure-evil-wartime-japanese-doctor-had-no-regard-for-human-suffering/.

[31] Barenblatt, 72.

[32] Harris, 80-81.

[33] Harris, 102.

[34] Brody, et. al.,221.

[35] Barenblatt, 72-73.

[36] Harris, 244-245.

[37] Tien-wei Wu, A Preliminary Review of Studies of Japanese Biological Warfare and Unit 731 in the United States, http://www.zzwave.com/cmfweb/wiihist/germwar/731rev.htm

[38] Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II, (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 101.

[39] Harris, 95.

[40] Jeanne Guillemin, Hidden Atrocities: Japanese Germ Warfare and American Obstruction of Justice at the Tokyo Trial, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 35.

[41] Guillemin, 37-38.

[42] Williams and Wallace, 138.

[43] Brody, et. al., 221.

[44] Williams and Wallace, 145-146.

[45] Brody, et. al., 222.

[46] Williams and Wallace,190.

[47] Guillemin, 260.

[48] Brody, et. al.,226.

[49] Condon-Rall and Cowdrey, 433.

[50] Guillemin, 310.

[51] Guillemin, 316-317.

[52] Harris, 321.

[53] Harris, 163.

[54] Linda Goetz Holmes, Guests of the Emperor: The Secret History of Japan's Mukden POW Camp, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010),21-22.

 

[55] Barenblatt, 232.

[56] Zachary D. Kaufman, "Transitional Justice Delayed Is Not Transitional Justice Denied: Contemporary Confrontation of Japanese Human Experimentation During World War 1I Through a People's Tribunal," Yale Law and Policy Review (2011), 645. https://doi.org/http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.13051/17088

[57] Cook and Cook, 167.

[58] “Controversy keeps Unit 731 testimonies from public display,” The Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 2023. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14982616.