Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire by Stanley Wolpert-A Review

 

Wolpert, Stanley. Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

              The Partition of India remains one of the great tragedies of the Twentieth century, with estimates of hundreds of thousands to over a million dead. The end of the British Raj witnessed the division of India with the creation of Pakistan, accompanied by communal violence and death, resulting in death and the migration of millions. The heartbreak of 1947 continues to impact the relationship between India and Pakistan. The massive slaughter of Partition still causes many historians and politicians to ponder the cause of the tragedy and whether there were other alternatives. In Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire, Stanley Wolpert explores the events that led to the tragic events of Partition. Wolpert examines Partition and the independence of India and Pakistan through a chronological survey beginning with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese and ending with the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir in 1948. Wolpert centers his study on the British and Indian leaders, whose decisions led to the tragedy of Partition. Wolpert contends that the massive death toll was avoidable if not for the "arrogance and ignorance of British and Indian leaders (2). The author places the bulk of the blame on the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, whose egotism and impatience prevented a peaceful resolution, leading to unneeded bloodshed.

            The book’s title, Shameful Flight, stems from the remarks made by Winston Churchill during the first debate over the Indian Independence Bill, when Churchill condemned the shameful flight of Britain from South Asia (9). The Labor Party's determination to leave India, combined with Mountbatten's insistence on accelerating the withdrawal, left the Indian subcontinent susceptible to terror and violence. Wolpert lays some blame on the shoulders of Indian leaders in addition to the British. Congress leaders failed to recognize the attempts by Sir Stafford Cripps to bring about Indian independence after World War II. Churchill undercut the Cripps mission even as the premier used Cripps to demonstrate to Roosevelt of British fairness to India (9). The Congress campaign, Quit India, gave Viceroy Linlithgow the excuse to imprison the leaders of Congress, including Nehru and Gandhi. The absence of Congress Party leaders allowed the leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah, the opportunity to demonstrate the loyalty of Muslim India to Britain while promoting Pakistan as a reward for the faithful service of Muslim troops.

            World War II significantly changed the British economy, as wartime dependence on Indian foodstuffs and iron made Britain a prime debtor to India. Labor victory in the 1945 general elections made economic and reform goals the priorities on Prime Minister Atlee’s agenda, placing the needs of India as an irritant that needed a quick resolution. Atlee hoped that the charisma of Mountbatten might charm Indian leaders and allow Britain to extract their troops and citizens while still maintaining their respectability. However, Wolpert contends that Mountbatten lacked the experience or sense to listen to India's most experienced leaders, Gandhi and Jinnah, who warned Mountbatten of the perils of a rushed partition (10). Further Mountbatten’s friendship with Nehru impacted his relationship with Jinnah. Nehru’s negative judgment of Jinnah colored the Viceroy’s interactions with Jinnah and led Mountbatten away from an even-handed approach (135). Mountbatten's negative assessment of Jinnah possibly influenced the drawing of the boundary favoring India. The Punjabi sub-districts of Firozpur and ZIra went to India despite being majority Muslim but allowed India a direct route to Kashmir.

            Mountbatten also ignored any advice or proposals from Gandhi, who continually warned the Viceroy of the perils awaiting India when Partition became a reality. Gandhi proposed to Mountbatten that Jinnah form a new central government with Muslim League members instead of a Congress-led government. Mountbatten never mentioned Gandhi's plan with Jinnah and instead discussed the plan with Nehru, who rejected the idea immediately.

But Mountbatten was so profoundly ignorant of the complexities he rushed into, and Nehru was so outraged by Gandhi’s “treacherous” idea that neither was willing to give it the chance of still saving India by proposing it to Jinnah (139).

 

Mountbatten dismissed Gandhi just as he dismissed Jinnah. The Viceroy determined to “cut and run, full speed ahead (141).

            Wolpert’s primary sources for his account are the twelve volumes on the end of the British Raj, entitled The Transfer of Power, 1942-7. The chronological treatment the author engages concentrates mainly on the prominent British and Indian leaders making the decisions. While Wolpert discusses the communal violence between Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, the actions and the suffering of ordinary people remain secondary to the thesis of the book. There is little doubt that decisions by the Congress Party and the Muslim League, in addition to British political leadership, led to the tragedy of Partition. Still, Wolpert claims that the results were not inevitable. Wolpert argues that Jinnah and Gandhi, "had either of British India's two greatest leaders been willing to subordinate his own ambitions to the leadership of the other, India might well have won its freedom much earlier and without Partition (3-4)."  However, one also needs to wonder if either Jinnah or Gandhi ever had complete command over their followers. As time passed, the ability of the leadership to control their constituencies entirely became almost impossible.

            After Indian independence, Mountbatten returned to Britain as a hero, but he left India and Pakistan with scars and hostility that remain today. As Viceroy, Mountbatten's primary concern was to absolve the British of the disaster on the horizon (167). Keeping the boundary lines secret until the last moment added to the confusion, leading to conflict. Wolpert’s examination of The Transfer of Power convinced him that Mountbatten’s incompetence and his negative attitude toward Jinnah contributed to the massive death toll of Partition (11). Nehru also looked back at Partition with regrets, seeing lost opportunities in his refusal of Cripp’s 1942 plan or later cabinet plans. Nehru held out hope for a federal link between India and Pakistan but feared that the other option was war (192).

            Partition remains one of the bloodiest tragedies of the twentieth century, and Wolpert performs an admirable job in demonstrating that the leadership mistakes led to the deaths of thousands, if not millions. But the outcome was avoidable. While South Asian leaders shared the blame, Wolpert makes a strong claim for British responsibility in a tragedy that lives on today as nuclear-powered India and Pakistan continue their dispute.