Wolpert, Stanley. Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
The
Partition of India remains one of the great tragedies of the Twentieth century,
with estimates of hundreds of thousands to over a million dead. The end of the
British Raj witnessed the division of India with the creation of Pakistan,
accompanied by communal violence and death, resulting in death and the
migration of millions. The heartbreak of 1947 continues to impact the
relationship between India and Pakistan. The massive slaughter of Partition
still causes many historians and politicians to ponder the cause of the tragedy
and whether there were other alternatives. In Shameful Flight: The Last
Years of the British Empire, Stanley
Wolpert explores the events that led to the tragic events of Partition. Wolpert
examines Partition and the independence of India and Pakistan through a
chronological survey beginning with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese and
ending with the Indo-Pakistani war over Kashmir in 1948. Wolpert centers his
study on the British and Indian leaders, whose decisions led to the tragedy of
Partition. Wolpert contends that the massive death toll was avoidable if not
for the "arrogance and ignorance of British and Indian leaders (2). The
author places the bulk of the blame on the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten,
whose egotism and impatience prevented a peaceful resolution, leading to
unneeded bloodshed.
The
book’s title, Shameful Flight, stems from the remarks made by Winston
Churchill during the first debate over the Indian Independence Bill, when
Churchill condemned the shameful flight of Britain from South Asia (9). The
Labor Party's determination to leave India, combined with Mountbatten's
insistence on accelerating the withdrawal, left the Indian subcontinent
susceptible to terror and violence. Wolpert lays some blame on the shoulders of
Indian leaders in addition to the British. Congress leaders failed to recognize
the attempts by Sir Stafford Cripps to bring about Indian independence after
World War II. Churchill undercut the Cripps mission even as the premier used
Cripps to demonstrate to Roosevelt of British fairness to India (9). The
Congress campaign, Quit India, gave Viceroy Linlithgow the excuse to imprison
the leaders of Congress, including Nehru and Gandhi. The absence of Congress
Party leaders allowed the leader of the Muslim League, Jinnah, the opportunity
to demonstrate the loyalty of Muslim India to Britain while promoting Pakistan
as a reward for the faithful service of Muslim troops.
World
War II significantly changed the British economy, as wartime dependence on
Indian foodstuffs and iron made Britain a prime debtor to India. Labor victory
in the 1945 general elections made economic and reform goals the priorities on
Prime Minister Atlee’s agenda, placing the needs of India as an irritant that
needed a quick resolution. Atlee hoped that the charisma of Mountbatten might
charm Indian leaders and allow Britain to extract their troops and citizens
while still maintaining their respectability. However, Wolpert contends that
Mountbatten lacked the experience or sense to listen to India's most
experienced leaders, Gandhi and Jinnah, who warned Mountbatten of the perils of
a rushed partition (10). Further Mountbatten’s friendship with Nehru impacted
his relationship with Jinnah. Nehru’s negative judgment of Jinnah colored the
Viceroy’s interactions with Jinnah and led Mountbatten away from an even-handed
approach (135). Mountbatten's negative assessment of Jinnah possibly influenced
the drawing of the boundary favoring India. The Punjabi sub-districts of Firozpur
and ZIra went to India despite being majority Muslim but allowed India a direct
route to Kashmir.
Mountbatten
also ignored any advice or proposals from Gandhi, who continually warned the
Viceroy of the perils awaiting India when Partition became a reality. Gandhi
proposed to Mountbatten that Jinnah form a new central government with Muslim
League members instead of a Congress-led government. Mountbatten never
mentioned Gandhi's plan with Jinnah and instead discussed the plan with Nehru,
who rejected the idea immediately.
But Mountbatten was so profoundly ignorant of the complexities he
rushed into, and Nehru was so outraged by Gandhi’s “treacherous” idea that
neither was willing to give it the chance of still saving India by proposing it
to Jinnah (139).
Mountbatten dismissed Gandhi just as he dismissed
Jinnah. The Viceroy determined to “cut and run, full speed ahead (141).
Wolpert’s
primary sources for his account are the twelve volumes on the end of the
British Raj, entitled The Transfer of Power, 1942-7. The chronological
treatment the author engages concentrates mainly on the prominent British and
Indian leaders making the decisions. While Wolpert discusses the communal
violence between Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, the actions and the suffering of
ordinary people remain secondary to the thesis of the book. There is little
doubt that decisions by the Congress Party and the Muslim League, in addition
to British political leadership, led to the tragedy of Partition. Still,
Wolpert claims that the results were not inevitable. Wolpert argues that Jinnah
and Gandhi, "had either of British India's two greatest leaders been
willing to subordinate his own ambitions to the leadership of the other, India
might well have won its freedom much earlier and without Partition
(3-4)." However, one also needs to
wonder if either Jinnah or Gandhi ever had complete command over their
followers. As time passed, the ability of the leadership to control their
constituencies entirely became almost impossible.
After
Indian independence, Mountbatten returned to Britain as a hero, but he left
India and Pakistan with scars and hostility that remain today. As Viceroy,
Mountbatten's primary concern was to absolve the British of the disaster on the
horizon (167). Keeping the boundary lines secret until the last moment added to
the confusion, leading to conflict. Wolpert’s examination of The Transfer of
Power convinced him that Mountbatten’s incompetence and his negative
attitude toward Jinnah contributed to the massive death toll of Partition (11).
Nehru also looked back at Partition with regrets, seeing lost opportunities in
his refusal of Cripp’s 1942 plan or later cabinet plans. Nehru held out hope
for a federal link between India and Pakistan but feared that the other option
was war (192).
Partition
remains one of the bloodiest tragedies of the twentieth century, and Wolpert
performs an admirable job in demonstrating that the leadership mistakes led to
the deaths of thousands, if not millions. But the outcome was avoidable. While
South Asian leaders shared the blame, Wolpert makes a strong claim for British
responsibility in a tragedy that lives on today as nuclear-powered India and
Pakistan continue their dispute.